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Mine Action with a Human Face: 
A Human Security Doctrine for Mine Action 
© Matthew Bolton, July 2008 
Human Security and Mine Action Discussion Paper 
Centre for the Study of Global Governance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Mine action needs to rediscover its ‘human face’,1 to remember, as UNMAS has said, 
that “It is not so much about mines as it is about people….”2  Empirical research in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan show that mine action is in danger of becoming distracted 
by commercial and strategic priorities.  This is especially true since the advent of the 
‘War on Terror’ and the continuing trend of consolidating the commercial mine action 
sector into the private security sector.   
 
Ten years ago a group of NGOs critical of the donor and commercial interests tried to 
develop a framework to guide mine action.  The resulting document, “Mine Action 
Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View”, sometimes referred to as ‘The 
Bad Honnef Framework’, argued that mine action must be guided by basic principles of 
participation, co-operation, coherence, sustainability and solidarity.3   Unfortunately, its 
influence has been relatively limited; in some places mine action is becoming a 
commodity to buy or an activity in support of counterinsurgency.  To counteract these 
trends, we need a ‘Human Security Doctrine for Mine Action’, guided by the following 
five principles: 
 
1. Doing no harm 
2. Protecting the vulnerable 
3. Participation 
4. Stewardship 
5. Building peace 
 
The following will outline each of these principles in more detail and explain how they 
relate to mine action.  
 
1. Doing No Harm 
Research on mine action, confirming the findings of the political economy of aid in 
conflict literature, has shown how demining interacts with the politics of the post-war 
                                                 
1 cf. Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly and Frances Stewart (eds.) (1987) Adjustment with a Human 
Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
2 UNMAS. (2005) “Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy.” p. 3. 
<http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/mine_action/role_undp/UN_Mine_Action_Policy.pdf>. 
3 ICBL. (2000) “Mine Action Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View: ‘The Bad Honnef 
Framework.’” Landmine Monitor 2000. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/appendices/bad_honnef.html>. 
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context.4  Too often, demining agencies have been unaware or unperturbed by way their 
programs are captured by local vested interests or strengthen networks that are opposed 
to peace. Demining agencies must become more aware of how their funding, priorities, 
recruitment, information gathering and management practices can exacerbate conflict or 
contribute to peace.   This will require demining agencies recruiting people from outside 
its traditional ex-military circles – development professionals, political scientists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, management specialists and economists – who are able to 
analyze social and organizational issues from different perspectives. 
 
Particularly important are considerations of whether to accept money from ‘belligerent 
donor’ (donors that are involved in the conflict), whether to use demining units of the 
military forces which were responsible for the conflict, how to vet potential deminers 
who have links to war crimes and atrocities and how to prevent the fragmentation of the 
public monopoly of force when using private security companies.  While this leads to 
some difficult choices, doing no harm must always be the guiding aspiration. 
 
This also applies to more technical matters.  Demining agencies must put safety first in 
their clearance efforts, ensuring their deminers are well trained, managed and equipped to 
do their dangerous work. They must also open channels of communication to the local 
communities surrounding their task to raise awareness of the mine problem and explain 
what is and what is not being cleared. Donors have a responsibility to ensure that their 
contracting systems do not incentivize corner-cutting and a ‘race to the bottom.’ Stable 
and long-term grants to idealistically motivated and professional institutions encourage 
investment in safety and quality. 
2. Protecting the Vulnerable 
The Bad Honnef Framework declares that “The needs and aspirations of people affected 
by mines are the starting point for mine action programmes.” 5  However, 
commercialization of clearance can erode this humanitarian principle, allocating 
demining according to ability to pay, rather than need.  Moreover, the integration of 
demining into the strategic objectives of counterinsurgency campaigns (such as in 
Afghanistan and Iraq) further corrodes mine action’s ‘humanitarian space.’ Putting 
military concerns first also allows countries to claim the right to use mines and cluster 
munitions to devastating effect upon civilians (as seen in Lebanon in 2006). 
 
                                                 
4 Mary B. Anderson.  (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War.  Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers; Jonathan Goodhand. (2006) Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed 
Conflict. Bourton on Dunsmore, Intermediate Technology Publications; David J. Keen. (2008) Complex 
Emergencies. Cambridge, Polity; Fiona Terry. (2002) Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of 
Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press; Alex de Waal.  (1998) Famine Crimes: 
Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa.  Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press; Mark 
Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. 
London, Zed Books; Mark Duffield. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the 
World of Peoples. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
5 ICBL. (2000) “Mine Action Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View: ‘The Bad Honnef 
Framework.’” Landmine Monitor 2000. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/appendices/bad_honnef.html>. 
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Reconceiving security as the protection of those most vulnerable, rather than those most 
privileged by nation or class, mine action must focus on securing the lives and 
livelihoods of those most affected by mine and UXO contamination.  At the same time, 
mine action agencies, the UN and progressive states must continue to strengthen and 
deepen international norms protecting non-combatants from both the short and long term 
effects of mines and cluster munitions. 
 
3. Participation 
Protecting the vulnerable cannot be an exercise in paternalism, for “As much as any 
human being, mine affected people and communities have the right to shape their own 
lives and to participate in political and economic decision making which concerns their 
interests.” 6  Therefore, as the Bad Honnef Framework asserted, ‘participation’ must be a 
guiding principle of mine action programs.  This means demining agencies should use 
community-based mapping and priority setting methods, such as those that have been 
successfully pioneered in Bosnia, employ local people as deminers and build local 
capacities to manage the mine and UXO problem. 
 
Moreover, mine action must be inclusive – aiming to incorporate persons from across 
local social divides of ethnicity, religion or political affiliation.  It must attempt to resist 
gender norms and recruit female deminers where possible.  It must involve people from 
non-military backgrounds, to encourage a diversity of perspectives. 
4. Stewardship 
This research project has demonstrated how the ‘principal-agent’ model of competitive 
tendering does not produce the results it promises.  Instead of increasing quality, there is 
a danger that it will encourage a ‘race to the bottom’, incentivizing corner-cutting, poor 
treatment of labor and unsafe practices. 
 
In its place, mine action donors should be guided by a ‘principal-steward’ model, in 
which they build long-term partnerships with trusted organizations that show dedication, 
professionalism and resolve.  By granting long-term funding, donors, in effect, create a 
property right for the implementer, encouraging them to invest in high standards.  Thus 
donors should encourage, and fund, their implementers to avoid cutting costs on training, 
equipment, oversight, insurance and health care for deminers.  Only through investing in 
people and organizations can one expect them to perform to their full capacity. 
5. Building Peace 
Ultimately, mine action is about restoring confidence that people are safe from violent 
threats of harm in their daily lives.  It is about removing barriers to safe freedom of 
movement and exchange.  Thus, it is an integral part of a society’s recovery from war.  
As the Bad Honnef Framework asserted, mine action programs should “support peace-
building including reconstruction and development of the community and aim at 
                                                 
6 ICBL. (2000) “Mine Action Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View: ‘The Bad Honnef 
Framework.’” Landmine Monitor 2000. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/appendices/bad_honnef.html>. 
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enhancing the socio-economic and cultural infrastructure.”7  Mine action must thus work 
to encourage the return of displaced people, kickstart the legitimate economy, restore 
cultural symbols of integration such as museums, monuments and centers of learning.  
 
Beyond this, however, mine action organizations should embody the peace envisioned.  
Espousing a multiethnic, law-governed society while supporting mono-ethnic demining 
agencies with links to organized crime, as some donors did in Bosnia, seems 
counterproductive.  Mine action agencies should be inclusive, incorporating people 
across social divisions of ethnicity, class or political affiliation.  They should also try to 
resist patriarchal patterns that entrench violence, by employing women deminers where 
possible and offering alternative constructions of masculinity based on service and saving 
lives. 
 
Moreover, through campaigning for regulations on the use of mines, cluster munitions 
and other technologies, mine action organizations should advocate for limits on the 
politics of violence.  They should further embody non-violent politics by limiting links to 
private military contracting and military forces and, where possible, prevent employees 
from bearing arms. 
 
 
                                                 
7 ICBL. (2000) “Mine Action Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View: ‘The Bad Honnef 
Framework.’” Landmine Monitor 2000. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/appendices/bad_honnef.html>. 
